tain supplies with the greatest difficulty.

This must naturally increase the scarcity which is acknowledged to be felt at Vienna, and which is so great that the populace besiege the bakers, and butchers shops day and night, just as they did at Paris during the early part of the revolution. Hungary was the source from whence Vienna usually drew supplies—but that source is no longer open, and to an application in behalf of the capital, made by Bonaparte to the Archduke Charles, a positive refusal is said to have been returned.

Whilst these events are passing in the southern parts of Germany, the north is not more disposed to remain quiet under the French yoke. The progress of the Austrians in Franconia and Saxony is already known. In Westphalia and Hesse the spirit of insurrection has shewn itself, and the "insurgent peasantry" as they are called, lately broke into the town of Marburgh on the Lahn. These peasants are not raw troops unused to arms; they are men who by the ancient constitution of the country were enrolled and exercised during a certain part of the year. Thus rapidly and vigorously is the spirit of insurrection spreading itself every where round the enemy. Meanwhile the archduke Charles is reinforcing himself by the landwher (militia) of Moravia and Bohemia, and so strong does he feel himself, that he has sent a part of the Hungarian insurrection, that had arrived at Brunn to join the archduke John at Comorn. This reinforcement is said to have enabled him to advance again and to resume his position at Raab. The two great Austrian armies under the archduke Charles and John occupy an almost strait line from Warkersdorff to Comorn. Presburgh is the centre of it.—Hence the French have made the greatest efforts to take Presburg; they would then have interposed between the two armies.—But all these efforts have been ineffectual, and marshal Davoust has been constantly repulsed in his attempt to make himself master of the Tete de Pont near Wolfsthal.

We have authority to state that the Austrian official account of the battle of Aspern will appear in a supplement to the Gazette of this evening. It consists of three sheets, and takes up the events of the war at the period of the battle of Abersburg and the capture of Ratisbon by the Austrians.—gives an account of the capture of Vienna, & follows the march of the archduke to the position where the battle was fought. It then gives the archduke's plan of the attack—states the Austrian force at 75,000 men—gives a detail of the battle of the 21st May, which it closes in the following manner—"For the first time Napoleon has sustained a defeat in Germany. The charm of his invincibility was dissolved. No longer the *spoiled Child* of Fortune; by posterity he will be characterised as the *sport* of the fickle Goddess."

It then proceeds to give a narrative of the battle of the 22d May—17,000 French muskets and 3000 cuirasses were taken.—The Austrians had 87 superior officers and 4190 subalterns and privates killed—663 officers, and 15,657 privates wounded—On the part of the French, 7000 were buried in the field of battle, and 5000 are wounded in the Austrian hospitals—In Vienna and the suburbs there are 29,263 wounded—2300 were taken; hundreds of corpses have floated down the Danube.

The account of the second battle closes in the following terms—"Thus terminated a conflict of two days—It was decisive for the glory of the Austrian arms, for the preservation of the monarchy, and for the correction of public opinion."

The prisoner taken on board a Dutch prize, sent into Dover by the Tiger revenue cutter, states that it was universally believed at Flushing, when they sailed, that another great battle had been fought upon the Danube on the 26th, which terminated in the defeat of the French army, with the loss of 50,000 men, 10,000 of whom belonged to Bonaparte's guards. The same person also states that there were lying at Flushing three men of war, full of troops, waiting for a favorable opportunity to put to sea, in consequence of which, a squadron sailed immediately from Deal for that part of the Dutch coast; that it was understood 20,000 Prussians were on their march to co-operate with the Austrian army; and that the greatest possible discontent prevailed in Holland, in consequence of the severity of the conscription law. Reports are also stated to have been circulated at Flushing of the assassination of Ferdinand VII. We know not what degree of credit to attach to those statements.

July 12.—We this day lay before our readers one of the most interesting and important documents that was ever offered to the public eye; the history of the campaign from the battle of Abensburg to that glorious victory of Aspern, which "has dissolved the charm of Bonaparte's invincibility, and reduced him to the rank of bold and successful generals, who, like himself, after a few series of destructive achievements, have experienced the vicissitudes of fortune."—A clearer, a more spirited, a more eloquent narrative never came from the hand of man—it is such a narrative as such an achievement deserves, and there is not a human being, at least there is not a Briton who reads it, who will not feel the deepest joy, admiration, gratitude, and enthusiasm for the cause of Austria. Men who can sustain such a cause in such a manner—who, after an unbroken series of disaster and defeat, of calamity and distress, can display such constancy and courage, such loyalty and patriotism cannot (no! it were treason to suppose they could) be subdued, and we have no more doubt that Austria will establish her independence and security, than we have that a British fleet will beat a French one whenever it is fortunate enough to meet with it. How fade the bulletins of Bonaparte before this manly and noble document! How contemptible & disgusting do they look when placed beside it! Here is none of the braggartdism and insolence which distinguished and degrade those labors of the Corsican.—Here are no claims to a victory gained with ease, and almost without effort. Every line pays tribute to the mightiness and difficulty of the conflict. We have the field of battle depicted to us in the clearest manner; we trace the march of each army—we follow the movements of the different columns; we see where the battle raged with the greatest fury, where the struggle was the most tremendous—we appreciate the talents of the different generals, and we behold, towering above them all, the two commanders in chief bringing into the conflict all the resources and energies of their mighty minds, and fighting for glory and for victory, for fame and for life.—How every thing was foreseen and provided against by the Archduke Charles! With a kind of prophetic wisdom he knew where the greatest efforts of the enemy would be directed, and there the enemy always found that preparations had been made to receive them. All the tactics and manœuvres of Bonaparte, his furious attempts to pierce the centre, and thus cut off the right wing from the left—his repeated efforts to turn the Austrian flanks, and thus come in their rear, were rendered unavailing by the admirable dispositions of the Austrian commander. After two days, the most sanguinary days that Europe ever saw, Bonaparte was at length compelled to yield the palm of pre-eminence, to descend from his towering height, to lose his character of invincible, and to resign the rank of being the first captain of the age.

It would be difficult to say which part of the conduct of the Archduke Charles deserves the most praise—that firmness of mind which made him not despair of stopping the progress of the enemy after the battle of Echmuhl—that confidence in his own talents which rendered him anxious to hazard a battle with the French, flushed though they were with uninterrupted success, and led on by Bonaparte in person—that astonishing presence of mind which rendered him equal to every emergency—or that consummate knowledge of the art of war which enabled him to beat the man who had arrogated to himself the title of invincible.

Yet, it is such an army under such a general, such a power making such exertions, that the late ministry would not assist with a a liberal hand; they would help her but sparingly with the treasures of England, whilst she is lavishing her blood in a cause which they will not deny to be as much British as Austrian—they would treat her with suspicion and distrust, and we well remember the efforts they made at first to damp our satisfaction by throwing doubts upon this great victory.—They would not even see "the symptoms of a defeat of the French."

A grateful task remains to be performed, and we dare say our readers anticipate us in what we are going to say. The Gazette shews by what sacrifices the late victory was gained. The killed and wounded of the Austrian army amount to twenty thousand. We can abate the grief of those who have lost their relatives—we can assuage the pain of those who are suffering under their wounds, by raising a subscription for their wives and families. It will be worthy of the exalted character of the British nation, and we hope to see it carried into execution without lost of time.

From the Independent American.

POTOMAC TO DELAWARE.

DEAR BROTHER,

I cannot express the pleasure I have received from the gentle and friendly admonition contained in your agreeable favor thro' Mr. Smith, from whom Mr. Patterson, being so well pleased with it, brought it nearer to me. I am encouraged by your desiring to hear from me, and proud of your promise to let me hear from you. I was afraid of neglect, having experienced much of that, and began to despond like others in these perplexing times. The beauty of language, with the benevolence of heart, so evident in you, will, I trust, arouse further attention to our purpose; and I shall be chiefly indebted to you for the pleasure of thinking my feeble efforts not altogether in vain.

I acknowlege the numerous favors you mention to have been bestowed on me by your own great powers, by your good son Schuylkill, and several of our eastern friends. I feel indebted also for other good things, such as tanners bark, large headed cabbages, and Irish potatoes in ship loads, for about one half of the prices demanded, & generally obtained by our own dear citizens for inferior qualities of those very articles, easily produced in the utmost abundance on every side of me. Hay was actually an article of importation here for some time after you resigned the seat of government to me. Some of my people, however, beginning, as all good things ought to begin, among the best of them, are finding out the value and the method of making hay at home, on their own lands, equal in fertility with any you or I could find any where. I know you have meadow ground on your sides worth $300 per acre. The importation of hay from New England is suspended here.

I have not been able as yet to return any of those favors, except in the single article of flour. To shew you that my people are apt, that I give them great opportunities, with the assistance of Conecocheague and some others of my sons, be it known that we furnish annually about two hundred thousand barrels of the finest flour in the United States. You will observe then, my benevolent brother, that I want nothing so much as those valuable people you have to spare. If they were to come here in thousands, they might, by continuing their meritorious exertions, become rich in a few years. I have room enough to welcome, and I do invite them to pass freely upon my waters in boats up into a fine country and climate, not unlike their own. My people heretofore were much in habits of having every thing provided for them, and in consequence were not very good managers; they would probably improve by the good example of many of yours, were they to come here, make pot and pearl ashes, tanners' bark, and as fine hemp as any in the world; this last article I could convey to my Navy Yard, where they may have instantly a check on the Bank of Columbia for 400 or 450 round hard silver dollars, for every ton of such hemp.

I have news still more important than all this for you, my illustrious brother, concerning great guns, which I was afraid would not be so agreeable to some of our friends, but recollecting that they are harmless things in themselves, until they become necessary these wicked times, or else our venerable parson would not so cordially approve of them as he appears to do. I can furnish iron to make great guns equal to those of brass. I do therefore invite any number of your valuable citizens to come, where I offer my canals, many of the first mill-seats in the U. States, or perhaps in the world, with this excellent iron close at my sides; let them come then, prepare cannon, organise horse artillery, and ship their guns, horses and appurtenances to Carracas, to Brazil, to Buenos Ayres, exchange them for silver, gold or diamonds, or what is more valuable, to wit, raw hides; provided you send some of your people to shew ours how to peel the bark from the trees to tan those hides.

There is now here, my dear brother, a respectable youth, born at my Georgetown, who could, and I believe he would, take pleasure in instructing your people in this important business of horse artillery. If he were to send his sergeant with a pair of them to the Spaniards at Carthagena, they would be ready to worship him, and to liberate all the American prisoners there at his request, besides making the fortunes of those concerned in the delivery of them, with a little necessary instruction. But you will say, my dear Delaware, that these articles are contraband of war. To this I will only say, at present, our valuable friends the Yankees, would manage this business or run the gauntlet. Cannon may go in one ship, a few trained horses, with a sample of the carriages, in another ship. Cannon will forever be required and in great demand by all those countries. Duke Charles, God prosper him, it seems, will cause a demand for cannon in Europe. I can and I want to furnish the means for providing some of those wanted on this side of the Atlantic. I wish the business in vigorous operation, not so much for the good of the Spaniards, whom God prosper, as for the good of my own country, and to nurse the valuable manufacture of arms, particularly horse artillery. We ought to have enough of them to be always ready for use, which might be sufficient to prevent much use for them in this country, either against French *democrats* or English aristocrats. Nor ever apprehend any such scenes as were lately exhibited near the Ebro and the Danube.

I have strayed away from the matter which I suppose you expected from me. I will make amends another time. It appeared to be necessary, my illustrious brother, to give you some information, to shew you, what your own good sense will now I trust approve of; your having yielded the seat of government to me, and also; that if you send a few thousand of your industrious people from delving in the Schuylkill to be happy here, it would I am sure contribute to your happiness. I could pass on in pleasing as well as in sound speculation, but I know myself unable to do justice to the matter; it is far, very far from being so with you. You can cheer; you can arouse; you can hasten much good to your country, and great pleasure to

Your much obliged and
affectionate brother,
POTOMAC.

I had like to forgot to acquaint you, that the Yankees when returning here, would take care to bring us salt instead of stones, when bulky articles of greater value were not plenty. My people seem to think it rather troublesome to call for salt and often bring back whole cargoes of stones, which are conveniently hove out to fill up the numerous wharves now erecting in Georgetown. If salt was cheap, I could send you some excellent beef. I am told there is no duty on salt now, but that ten cents the bushel will be laid on it the next year.

FROM BELL'S (LONDON) MESSENGER.

Causes of the Misfortune of the Austrians—The disasters of the Austrians have happened so unexpectedly, and so completely, that an opinion is generally prevalent, that they could not have happened fairly; that the enemy has availed himself of his usual weapon, and triumphed more by corruption than by arms. There are certain reasons so efficient, and always so ready, that they are uniformly brought forward in cases of difficulty. If a king dies at the exact nick of time for the fortunes of his successor, he is always said to have been poisoned. If an army be defeated contrary to expectation, the assigned cause is treachery, procured by corruption. There certainly cannot be a doubt that both treachery and poison have been occasionally employed, for these and similar purposes; for, fortunately for human nature, these must still be considered as unnatural and extraordinary expedients, and therefore should never be imputed without the strongest positive or presumptive evidence. No one will pretend that there can be any thing of positive evidence in the corruption and consequent treachery now alleged. And as to presumptive evidence; where the ordinary causes are sufficient, it is surely unnecessary to have recourse to such as are extraordinary. It is in reasoning as in poetry, he is an inferior dramatist, who can only resolve his catastrophe by the bowl and the dagger. He is a narrow logician, who in all cases has no arguments but treachery and corruption.

The defeat of the Austrians has been occasioned by those causes which in the conflict of armies, always determines the event. War is strictly a game of skill, in which those are certain of victory who possess the greater portion of that quality which commands it. The Austrians have been defeated by the French from the very simple reason that the French were their superiors in military skill—that the French military system was superior to that of the Austrians, and that the French officers and French soldiers have discharged their duties in a more masterly manner than the Austrians.

It is still within the memory of many, when even the naval battles of England, though constantly in our favor, were almost always fruitless. The enemy escaped us almost uninjured—and a barren victory, a mere laurel, was the only result of our general engagements. At that period, however, our seamen and our officers were as brave as they are at present. Whence then originated the difference between the results of our victories in the period of which we are speaking and the present? Simply in one point—we had a bad system. Lord Rodney wa the first who being in circumstances which required peculiar efforts, entirely departed from the ancient system, & substituted one of his own. According to the ancient system, ship engaged ship, and each tried to get to leeward of the other. According to Lord Rodney's system, the English fleet formed in one strong line, and then bore down upon the enemy so as to break and divide his line; in which case they directed the main efforts of the whole fleet to destroy one of the divisions of the enemy so separated, and contented themselves with keeping the others in check, till, having destroyed the one, they had leisure to attend to the remainder. Since the days of Rodney, this has been the common system of the English admirals, and it has always been attended with the same success. Instead of a mere barren glory, a victory now is nothing unless the fruit of it have been the capture and destruction of nearly a whole fleet.

It is the same with the French military as with the English naval system. The system of Bonaparte is founded upon precisely the same principles. In description nothing can be more simple. Its characteristic point is obvious to every one. It consists in compressing and compacting all his strength in one point or part, and having thus formed a kind of wedge, driving it through some certain part of the enemy. For example, if he drew up his army in three bodies or divisions, he will throw all his strength into the centre, leaving only such a strength in his wings, as may enable them to keep the enemy at bay. With his centre thus constituted, he will fall upon the weakest part of his enemy's line, and by dint of mass and numbers he is sure to penetrate and break it. The very circumstance of having their line broken throws them into confusion, and gives moreover an advantage in point of position which is almost certain of being decisive. The broken part being routed, the French centre, under this hypothesis, is in the rear of the remaining part of their enemy's line, whilst in the mean time the French wings are attacking them in front. Such a position as this almost necessarily decides the fate of the day.

The Austrians, moreover, are peculiarly unfitted to have any chance of opposing an attack of this nature. The weak part of their line is necessarily broken and dissipated by the superior mass of the French. But according to the habits of an Austrian soldier, resulting no doubt from a defective discipline, when an Austrian division is once routed, once dissipated, they never can rally—they never can re-assemble in the same day and upon the same field. They will fight bravely as a body, and they will continue to fight bravely, even when broken into individuals; they will be cut to pieces, but they will not form again. The French on the other hand, will separate, and re-assemble a score times in a minute, and therefore, even by this part of their discipline, or rather their habits, are necessarily an overmatch for the Austrians. This, therefore, is another point of the superiority of the French system, that the French by their versatility are seldom so routed, but what they can re-assemble, whilst the Austrians, once broken, are like glass, no art can put them together without a new creative process. This peculiar system of the Austrian army renders it equally incompetent to pursue any advantage. In a word, any thing which dissolves the mass, which breaks that compactness, which constitutes the strength of the Austrian army, annihilates its power. On the defensive, and whilst they remain in a mass, and on a point, the Austrian army is the best in the universe. But its strength is gone when it begins to move. When its ranks open, whether in advance or pursuit, the advantage is necessarily on the side of those who are most flexible. The French fight on the principle of the Macedonian phalanx, and retreat on the principle of the Parthians. By a union of these two principles, compactness in attack, and a most peculiar felicity in rallying in a retreat, the French have an invincible superiority over the Austrians, and as long as their relative systems shall remain the same, so long will the events of every campaign, if not of every battle, be uniform.

The French bulletins give an account of the battles, which so exactly correspond with these principles, that we conceive it unnecessary to say any thing as to their immediate application. The French, confident in their superiority, make no disguise;—they doubtless exaggerate in the most extreme degree, but with due allowances for such exaggeration, their accounts may be depended upon. They are incomparably superior to the meagre narratives, which are ordinarily given in the German papers. Let any one for example compare the French bulletins and the Prague Gazettes, and then decide on the superiority.

A circumstance has been stated, which may possibly have operated not a little to produce the disaster which has befallen the army of the emperor Francis. Napoleon carried with him into Germany a very large sum of money, (about two millions sterling, mostly in Napoleons) with the intention of applying it to the purposes of corruption in the Austrian army. Past experience gives us no reason to doubt the fact, and we are sorry to add, that the same experience furnishes us with abundant reason to dread the efficacy of such an engine. The misfortune is that a similar weapon cannot be wielded with equal efficacy against the aggressor; for generals who hope to receive crowns and kingdoms as the reward of their attachment to their chief, may take bribes, but will not betray their masters.

WASHINGTON CITY.

WEDNESDAY, SEPT. 6.

The fate of AUSTRIA appears to be decided.

For particulars see the news under the Baltimore head in the succeeding columns.

The SECRETARY OF STATE and the SECRETARY of the TREASURY have returned to the city.

Mr. ERSKINE, the British Minister, arrived her on Monday morning.

Mr. JACKSON, the British Envoy, has arrived at Annapolis.

On Monday the subscription for the stock of the BANK OF WASHINGTON was opened at Long's Hotel. We have the pleasure to state that the number of shares to which the subscription is limited, (25,000 shares at 40 dollars each) was subscribed before 2 o'clock. At 4 o'clock, till which hour the commissioners were required to keep open the books, 56,000 shares were subscribed, and many persons were in attendance, whose subscriptions, if they could have been received, would have added very considerably to the surplus already subscribed. In order to reduce the number of shares to that fixed by the constitution of the Bank, an amount equal to the surplus will be deducted from the shares of those who have subscribed to the largest amount.

Every friend of the city will learn with pleasure this testimony of its increasing prosperity.

The ship Resource Capt. Nicholas, sailed from the Eastern Branch yesterday, with naval stores for Algiers.

We have often had occassion to admire the *solid sense* displayed by our federal friends at their convivial meetings, as well as the brilliancy of their effusions of wit and genius on such occasions. "*In vino veritas*"—a man in his cups, it is said, generally speaks the genuine dictates of his heart.—But it would be ungenerous to attribute to *all* federalists the humane wish contained in the following toast given at a federal dinner in the state of Ohio at the late Anniversary of our independence:—

"*Thomas Jefferson*—may his shin bones be converted into drumsticks, to beat the triumph of federalism in the U. States!"

FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER.

DELAWARE TO POTOMAC.

LETTER II.

My Dear Brother and friend,

You give me much pleasure and do me great honor by the promptitude with which you answered my first letter and the satisfaction you express at receiving it. Be assured that every grateful feeling you experience on this occasion is more than reciprocated on my part; and my pride is not a little nourished by the assurance I now feel that our correspondence may become useful to our people. They will read our letters, they will participate in our sentiments; and while, like other good children, they listen with pious attention to the counsels of their aged guardians, they may learn practical lessons of brotherly kindness among themselves, from being thus frequently edified by ours.

You are a powerful potentate, an affectionate brother; and I rejoice to find in you such a decided taste for improving the immense advantages that the permanent allotment of nature