“ 2. Great inland navigation opened the whole way by canals, from the north river to lake Ontario, 2,200,000

“ 3. Canal around the falls and rapids of Niagara, opening a sloop navigation from lake Ontario to the upper lakes, as far as the extremities of lake Michigan, 1,000,000 — 4,000,000

Making together, $ 16,600,000

“ IV. The great geographical features of the country have been solely adhered to in pointing out those lines of communication: and these appear to embrace all the great interests of the union, and to be calculated to diffuse and increase the national wealth in a very general way, by opening an intercourse between the remotest extremes of the United States. Yet it must necessarily result from an adherence to that principle, that those parts of the Atlantic states through which the great western and north west communications will be carried, must, in addition to the general advantages in which they will participate, receive from those communications greater local and immediate benefits, than the eastern, and perhaps southern states. As the expense must be defrayed from the general funds of the union, justice, and perhaps policy not less than justice, seem to require that a number of local improvements, sufficient to equalize the advantages, should also be undertaken in those states, parts of states, or districts, which are less immediately interested in those inland communications. Arithmetical precision cannot indeed be obtained in objects of that kind; nor would an apportionment of the monies applied, according to the population of each state, be either just or practicable; since roads, and particularly canals, are often of greater utility to the states which they unite, than to those through which they pass. But a sufficient number of local improvements, consisting either of roads or canals, may without any material difficulty be selected so as to do substantial justice, and give general satisfaction. Without pretending to suggest what would be the additional sum necessary for that object, it will, for the sake of round numbers, be estimated at 3,400,000

“ Which added to the sum estimated for general improvements, 16,600,000

“ Would make an aggregate of twenty millions of dollars, 20,000,000

“ An annual appropriation of two million of dollars, would accomplish all those great objects in ten years, and may without inconvenience, be supplied in time of peace, by the existing revenues and resources of the United States. This may be exemplified in several ways.

“ The annual appropriation on account of the principal and interest of the public debt, has, during the last six years, amounted to eight millions of dollars. After the present year, or at farthest, after the ensuing year, the sum which, on account of the irredeemable nature of the remaining debt, may be applied to that object, cannot in any one year exceed 4,600,000 dollars, leaving therefore from that source alone, an annual surplus of 3,400,000 dollars, applicable to any other object.

“ From the 1st January, 1801, to the 1st January, 1809, a period of eight years, the United States shall have discharged about 34 millions of the principal of the old debt, or deducting the Louisiana debt, incurred during the same period, and not yet discharged, about 23 millions of dollars. They may with equal facility, apply in a period of ten years, a sum of 20 millions of dollars, to internal improvements.

“ The annual permanent revenue of the United States, calculated on a state of general peace, and on the most moderate estimate, was in a report made to Congress on the 6th day of December, 1806, computed for the years 1809-1815, at 14 millions of dollars. The annual expenses on the peace establishment, and including the 4,600,000 dollars, on account of the debt, and 400,000 dollars for contingencies, do not exceed eight millions and a half, leaving an annual surplus of five millions and a half of dollars. To provide for the protection and defence of the country, is undoubtedly the object to which the resources of the United States, must, in the first instance be applied, and to the exclusion of all others, if the times shall require it. But it is believed, that in times of peace, (and to such period only are these remarks applicable) the surplus will be amply sufficient to defray the expences of all the preparatory measures of a permanent nature, which prudence may suggest, and to pay the sum destined for internal improvements. Three millions annually applied during the same period of ten years, would arm every man in the United States, fill the public arsenals and magazines, erect every battery and fortification which could be manned, and even, if thought eligible, build a navy. That the whole surplus would be inadequate to the support of any considerable increase of the land or naval force kept in actual service in time of peace, will be readily admitted. But such a system is not contemplated: if ever adopted, the objects of this report must probably be abandoned. For, it has not heretofore been found an easy task for any government to indulge in that species of expences, which leaving no trace behind it, adds nothing to the real strength of the country, and at the same time to provide for either its permanent defence or improvement.

“ It must not be omitted that the facility of communications, constitutes, particularly in the United States, an important branch of national defence. Their extensive territory opposes a powerful obstacle to the progress of an enemy. But on the other hand, the number of regular forces, which may be raised, necessarily limited by the population, will for many years be inconsiderable when compared with that extent of territory. That defect cannot otherwise be supplied than by those great national improvements, which will afford the means of a rapid concentration of that regular force, and of a formidable body of militia, on any given point.

“ Amongst the resources of the union, there is one, which from its nature, seems more particularly applicable to internal improvements. Exclusively of Louisiana, the general government possesses, in trust for the people of the United States, about one hundred millions of acres fit for cultivation, north of the river Ohio, and near fifty millions south of the state of Tennessee. For the disposition of those lands a plan has been adopted, calculated to enable every industrious citizen to become a freeholder, to secure indisputable titles to the purchasers, to obtain a national revenue, and above all to suppress monopoly. Its success has surpassed that of every former attempt, and exceeded the expectations of its authors. But a higher price than had usually been paid for waste lands by the first inhabitants of the frontier became an unavoidable ingredient of a system intended for general benefit, and was necessary in order to prevent the public lands being engrossed by individuals possessing greater wealth, activity or local advantages. It is believed that nothing could be more gratifying to the purchasers, and to the inhabitants of the western states generally, or better calculated to remove popular objections, and to defeat insidious efforts, than the application of the proceeds of the sales to improvements conferring general advantages on the nation, and an immediate benefit on the purchasers and inhabitants themselves. It may be added, that the United States, considered merely as owners of the soil, are also deeply interested in the opening of those communications, which must necessarily enhance the value of their property. Thus the opening of an inland navigation from tide water to the great lakes, would immediately give to the great body of land bordering on those lakes, as great value as if they were situated at the distance of one hundred miles by land from the sea coast. And if the proceeds of the first ten millions of acres which may be sold, were applied to such improvements, the United States would be amply repaid in the sale of the other ninety millions.

“ The annual appropriation of two millions of dollars drawn from the general revenues of the union, which has been suggested, could operate to its full extent only in times of peace and under prosperous circumstances. The application of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands, might perhaps be made permanent until it had amounted to a certain sum, and until the most important improvements had been effected. The fund created by those improvements, the expence of which has been estimated at twenty millions of dollars, would afterwards become itself a perpetual resource for further improvements. Altough some of those first communications should not become immediately productive, and although the same liberal policy, which dictated the measure, would consider them less as objects of revenue to government, than of increased wealth and general convenience to the nation, yet they would all sooner or later acquire, as productive property, their par value. Whenever that had taken place in relation to any of them, the stock might be sold to individuals or companies, and the proceeds applied to a new improvement. And by persevering in that plan, a succession of improvements would be effected until every portion of the U. S. should enjoy all the advantages of inland navigation and improved roads, of which it was susceptible. To effect that great object, a disbursement of twenty millions of dollars, applied with more or less rapidity according to the circumstances of the U. S. would be amply sufficient.

“ The manner in which the public monies may be applied to such objects, remains to be considered.

“ It is evident that the U. S. cannot under the constitution open any road or canal, without the consent of the state through which such road or canal must pass. In order therefore to remove every impediment to a national plan of internal improvements, an amendment to the constitution was suggested by the Executive when the subject was recommended to the consideration of Congress. Until this be obtained, the assent of the states being necessary for each improvement, the modifications under which that assent may be given, will necessarily control the manner of applying the money. It may be however observed that in relation to the specific improvements which have been suggested, there is hardly any which is not either already authorised by the states respectively, or so immediately beneficial to them, as to render it highly probable that no material difficulty will be experienced in that respect.

“ The monies may be applied in two different manners: the U. S. may with the assent of the states, undertake some of the works at their sole expense; or they may subscribe a certain number of shares of the stock of companies incorporated for the purpose. Loans might also in some instances be made to such companies. The first mode would perhaps, by effectually controlling local interests, give the most proper general direction to the work. Its details would probably be executed on a more economical plan by private companies. Both modes may perhaps be blended together so as to obtain the advantages pertaining to each. But the modifications of which the plan is susceptible must vary according to the nature of the work, and of the charters, and seem to belong to that class of details, which are not the immediate subject of consideration.

“ At present the only work undertaken by the U. S. at their sole expence, to which the assent of the states has been obtained, is the road from Cumberland to Brownsville. An appropriation may for that purpose be made at any time. In relation to all other works, the U. S. have nothing at this time in their power but to assist those already authorised; either by loans or by becoming stockholders; and the last mode appears the most eligible. The only companies incorporated for effecting some of the improvements considered in this report as of national and first rate importance, which have applied for such assistance, are the Chesapeake and Delaware canal, the Susquehannah canal, and the Dismal Swamp companies; and authority might be given to subscribe a certain number of shares to each, on condition that the plan of the work to be executed should be approved by the general government. A subscription to the Ohio canal, to the Pittsburg road, and perhaps to some other objects not fully ascertained, is also practicable at this time.

“ As an important basis of the general system, an immediate authority might also be given to take the surveys and levels of the routes of the most important roads and canals which are contemplated: a work always useful, and by which the practicability and expence of the undertakings would be ascertained with much more correctness than in this report. A moderate appropriation would be sufficient for those several objects.

“ In the selection of the objects submitted in obedience to the order of the Senate, as claiming in the first instance the aid of the general government, general principles have been adhered to, as best calculated to suppress every biass of partiality to particular objects. Yet some such biass, of which no individual is perfectly free, may without being felt, have operated on this report. The national legislature alone, embracing every local interest, and superior to every local consideration, is competent to the selection of such national objects. The materials contained in the papers herewith transmitted, and the information to be derived from surveys taken under the authority of the general government, will furnish the facts necessary for a correct decision. Two communications, by Mr. B. H. Latrobe, and by Mr. Robert Fulton, marked E and F are in the mean while respectfully referred to, as containing much interesting practical information, connected with observations of a general nature, on the subject.”

For the National Intelligencer.

The Farmer—No. II.

Concluded.

So much for the objections urged against this caucus. Now for the grounds on which its necessity as well as expediency are established.

Is there, or is there not, a necessity for union and concert among the republicans in the election of a Chief Magistrate? If there is, the means of obtaining this union and concert must be pursued. I will not condescend to argue the first point. Every rational republican admits the necessity. The times prove it. It is a necessity, too, which can never intermit; for the moment such concert is neglected, the opponents of the republicans have carried their point; they will adroitly and instantly seize the opportunity, the victory will be theirs, and it will be too late to remedy the evil.

What then are the means of obtaining this union, and concert? It is obvious that they must be co-extensive with the United States. Possessed of this indispensable trait they can only be found in a body of men collectively expressing the general sentiment of the republicans of the union. As for obtaining such an expression, through the medium of the public prints, or meetings of citizens in their respective districts, that is out of the question. To command harmony, union, and concert, and eventually to ensure unanimity, the nominating body must be able to draw the national sentiment they express to a point, and thus, and thus only, prevent the different parts of the union from being divided on different candidates. Without such a general representative body, an indefinite number of candidates might be named, of equal pretensions, each candidate having his active advocates; the local feelings of numerous districts would be inflamed; personal animosities ensue; all which circumstances collectively could not fail of producing defeat. To guard against these fatal evils it is indispensable that the local expressions of opinion should be waved until a general nomination took place. This is precisely analogous to the principles of our government in the exercise of other political rights and duties. In each election district there is generally a meeting of the electors called to nominate the representatives; and the voice of the nominating majority is sanctioned by the whole meeting. So, when the representatives are convened, in the enaction of laws the will of the majority prevails. Each particular law is not previously canvassed in every section of the country; but it is initiated and consummated in the general representative body. Were it otherwise the distraction and difficulty of transacting business would be endless and invincible.

How then can a general body fairly representing the republican party be obtained?

The republican members of Congress, it is admitted, constitute the best body of this kind in existence. It is not, indeed, going too far, to say that they were elected, if not for the discharge of this among other duties, at least with a perfect understanding of their constituents that it would be discharged by them. Such a duty having in fact been thus discharged invariably from the commencement of the government, and the object being too important to be overlooked, it is no strained inference to consider it as having been pointedly in the view of the people at the time of chusing their representatives. There is one circumstance, which unquestionably, has its weight, & ought not to be lost sight of in every such nomination. In the *federal* states, in which representatives are chosen by a general ticket, the republican minority have no representatives on the floor of Congress, and have, consequently, in such nomination no participation. An allowance ought therefore to be made in this case, and if it should be made to appear that the votes to which such a minority in Congress are entitled would turn the scale in favor of any candidate other than the one commanding the suffrages of the majority of the other republican members, such candidate ought to be preferred. But whatever abstract force there may be in this argument, it is altogether inapplicable to the nomination of Mr. Madison. The only federal states are Delaware and Connecticut; the republican part of the former of which has unequivocally declared itself in favor of Mr. Madison; and with regard to Connecticut, there is also every reason to believe the republicans there also in favor of Mr. Madison; but even supposing it otherwise, after the set-off of Delaware, but a difference of one or two votes would be the result.

It appears, therefore, that in the present instance the republican representatives were a body that fairly expressed the general sentiment.

What other body could be constituted?

It might be sufficient, to shew the impracticability of forming such a body, to say that the opponents of the Congressional Caucus have themselves offered no plea for its formation. Their ingenuity has, no doubt, been put to the rack, and they would unquestionably have proposed any plan calculated to obtain the support of the nation.

Such a body might, however, perhaps, be composed of delegates chosen by the republican representatives of the several state legislatures; or by the several sections of the people.

Let us enquire how adequate such a body would be to express fairly the general sentiment.

If chosen by the several state legislatures, the first consideration that offers itself is whether the two branches, composing each legislature, should vote jointly or concurrently. Let not this be considered as a light difficulty. The usual feature of discrimination between the Senators and Representative is the duration of their appointments. In the former it is for from one to six years; in the latter from six months to two years, but generally for one year. If, therefore, the election of the conventional delegates ought to be an expression of the existing sentiment of the people, ought the Senators, chosen so remotely, to have any voice whatever? much less ought they to have a power, collectively equal to the Representatives? The concurrent vote, in case of a collision of opinion, would altogether defeat the existing sentiment of the state; and the joint vote might itself have the same effect, by adding the votes of the Senators to a minority of the republican representatives, holding opinions at variance with the general sentiment.

The next point, to be decided, would be the number of delegates to be chosen. They must be equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives of the states, or to the proportion of the republicans in each state to its whole numbers. Should the former rule prevail, it would directly destroy the prevalence of the will of the majority, by giving as many delegates to a state not republican, as to one altogether so. This would be consequently inadmissible. Should, on the contrary, the other rule be observed, how difficult, not to say impossible, would it be fairly to graduate the measure of its application? Who would be called upon to decide the relative strength of the republicans in each state? The members of the two branches jointly or concurrently? Here the same difficulty, already noticed, would be to be overcome. How would the different parties calling themselves republican, decide the question? The motive of adding to their power in the national scale would induce them to unite their forces; but every other motive would lead them to disunion. It is almost certain that in practice it would be found impossible to produce a concurrence in the choice of delegates sent to the same Convention. It is almost certain, that we should have as many conventions as there should be parties among the republicans in the several state legislatures. This would, probably, be equivalent to having no convention at all; nay, worse. For what chance could there exist of a particular party in the legislature of one state uniting with another party in a different legislature in sending delegates to the same convention; when the grounds on which each party was formed were principally local? To constitute such conventional bodies, it is therefore obvious, would be to multiply the chances of disunion, discord, weakness, and eventual defeat among the republicans.

All these difficulties and objections, if possible, would be still more aggravated should a convention be attempted to be formed by the election of delegates by assemblies of the republicans in different sections of the union. The difficuly of deciding who were properly qualified to vote would be insuperable, from which would result the consequent admission of every person that attended. Of the whole number entitled to vote but a small part would attend; and it is probable that the total want of any legal provisions for such meetings, regulating the time, manner or objects of their assembly, would prevent the most prudent and respectable part of the community from attending at all.

When convened, the same, and even greater difficulty, than that felt by the members of the legislatures, would attend the decision of the portion of political weight to which their