of the higher grades cannot be wanted in a garrison or fort. In that respect then this bill must have some surplussage about it as two additional brigadier generals and other high officers are intended to be created, and should no war be created to employ them, we shall have them to look at; that is all! But there seems to be another species of ingenuity about this bill which it is somewhat difficult to comprehend. It was once a fashion with us to object to that of giving the President discretion to raise or not to raise an army. That was urged to be the duty of Congress alone, and was a power not to be transferred. This bill withholds that discretion in appearance at least, but it seems gives the power of disbanding. There may be some difference in this thing, but the distinction must be at any rate a nice one! Not very palpable at any rate.

One other character there is, said Mr. Stanford, to whom allusion has not been made, and who if he were gone, day light would close in upon some of the most brilliant actions of the militia of the Carolinas during the revolution. This character (Gen. Sumpter) remains amongst us, and is a living monument of first principles, and of unvarying political system through every *crisis*. On the passage of the provisional army bill in '98 he appears the friend and defender of the militia and their worth. He knew their services best; for under his particular command they acquired a great share of the glory and honor to which they were entitled. He defended their character and performances to the South, leaving it to gentlemen from the North, among whom was yourself, Mr. Speaker, to do them justice in that quarter of the union. Among the instances of those performances he enumerates some that would do honor to the best disciplined corps in the world. He mentions an action fought at Fishing Creek, S. Carolina, as doing the militia immortal honor; another at Rocky Mount, which lasted ten hours—and this by the patriot militia, fighting, as they would do again, we may confidently say, for their own firesides—Another instance is given at the Hanging Rock, which lasted nearly all day—another at Waynesboro; but the speech itself is on file, and to it I refer gentlemen. It is an answer to all I have ever heard on this floor in favor of standing armies.

Before I take my seat I will notice the view which my usually correct and worthy colleague (Mr. Macon) has taken of the existing state of things, and will add my own also. Formerly our difficulties were with France—her cruizers were let loose upon us; our negociation was broken off with more indignity than now with Great Britain, and we were informed by the President that he would never send another embassy to France till assurances were made that our ministers should be received and respected as coming from a great, free and powerful nation; and but for a mission of which I know nothing, except that I believe it was the offspring of real patriotism, & the explanations made in France through that medium we must have gotten into open, formal war; for if these files are authority sufficient to shew it (they are now before me) that France had at that time laid an embargo on all our merchant vessels as preliminary to it; and this with the knowledge that France was then flushed with victory, and extending invasion into every quarter of the world, and in every direction around her, formed a base to raise a standing army upon as plausible at least, if not more so than any thing that appears in the present state of things. But my colleague contends (and so it was then contended) that we have received the blow, and are already in a kind of quid war—that our negociation is broken off, & so it was formerly—and that it is time now to apprehend war in a more open form, and to begin to prepare. I ask if it was not more than apprehension in '98? I for one am prepared to say, that I am willing to confide in the militia for the first onset, if war shall happen, that I will never consent to raise an army on a war establishment upon mere apprehension; and at any rate if war we are to have, I do not want a quid army, nor one of a quid size, such as the President himself tells us, "as a defence against invasion would be as nothing." But in fact I doubt if we are to have war. We don't know that all negociation is at an end; but if so, let gentlemen come out and bottom their measures upon determined war. Let the friends of this bill so declare, and much as I desire to think and to act on all great questions with my colleague, and another behind me (Mr. Blount) whose opinions I have always respected, because they deserve respect (for I know he has seen service and knows much from experience). I promise them and the more experienced portion of this House, I will not withhold all due means to insure the object of any enterprize that may be contemplated. If it be determined, and it becomes an object to invade the Canadas, we have nothing to conceal in that event. If we say so, I have no doubt we can do it with success. It cannot be doubted if policy, interest, or just reparation for the outrages lately committed suggest it, we can both say it and do it—exclude the proud name of British America from the continent at least. I speak not of what I myself am prepared at present to do, but the friends of the bill are a majority, and can say and do as they please in that respect.

Mr. Stanford further said he had been guilty of one error in his life on the subject of standing troops, and as he anticipated being told of it, he was disposed to ward off the blow by open and previous confession; he had voted with a number of his friends in '98 for the 12 regiments, but he would say it was the result of a caucus, unpleasant as it may be to own it. He was now opposed to the pledging system of business, though not prepared to say that consultations might not be held with propriety upon some occasions. He was led into it from motives, as he thought, of just policy. A leading member of the then majority had laid a motion on the table for raising fifty thousand men; such a monstrous army as that in a free country, and the taxes I knew must follow, alarmed myself and others into a quid system then, as a set-off against the greater evil. And let me declare, said Mr. S. without meaning offence to any side of the House, that it was the only federal vote I ever gave in my life upon any great question which went to mark the political principles of the day. He hoped his candor upon this occasion would have its weight with the House in obtaining their forgiveness under the circumstances in which he was placed; and he promised his friends he would not be soon caught in the same way again; for quid armies never.

Mr. Macon said, that as he had been charged with inconsistency by his colleague, his situation compelled him to make some reply. His life, he said, had been spent in the public service without ever having before incurred a charge of that nature—[Mr. Stanford begged leave to declare that he had not the slightest intention to accuse his colleague of inconsistency; as he had expressly said, that if the gentleman's position that we are at war was correct, his vote would be so. He hoped his colleague would believe him when he declared that he had no intention to make any charge.] Mr. M. said he was willing to take the explanation. If the state of things (said he) now be as it was in '98, I admit the charge of inconsistency; but as I yesterday endeavored to shew, they are materially dissimilar. With respect to hunting up the journals the gentleman may be satisfied that I shall never do it. I never did, nor ever shall search the journals to prove inconsistency; if the gentlemen had not stated his vote, I should never have taken the pains to do it. I allow my friends to differ with me in opinion, and I shall take the liberty of differing with them, whenever my reason points out a course of conduct different from that which they pursue. This is the first time I have ever been willing to vote for a single man, and that for reasons given yesterday. To some with whom I am intimate it was known before I rose yesterday what my vote on this occasion would be; it was not known to all, for to none am I responsible but to those whose representative I am. My constituents will have an opportunity to express their sentiments of my conduct at our next election; if they deem me consistent and approve my conduct, they will evince it: for to them, and them alone, am I responsible. I did not yesterday when I came to the House intend to have spoken; nor should I have spoken but for the reasons then mentioned. We have lately had a voluminous communication from the President, comprising much important information. Before we received that, if this bill had been called up I should have voted against it. Let any man read them and say if what I yesterday stated as possible, is not more than likely to happen.

If I have departed from the principles which I have formerly pursued, it is from the imperfection of human nature. No man is infallible. My colleague has been remarkably happy if the vote for the 12 regiments was the only incorrect vote he ever gave in his life. For my own part, I dare say, I have given many more than one incorrect vote.

With respect to the crisis of 1805 and 6, that made a very different impression on my mind from that which it made on the minds of some gentlemen; for I believe the Spaniards hired Americans to bring the men in question over the line. It is useless to go into detail on that point; though I was under no apprehension at that time of serious consequences.

With respect to what my colleague has said about the message of the President, I must leave my actions to speak. If I have had a blind confidence in any executive, it is unknown to me; and I believe that any gentleman as conversant with the journals as my colleague is, would find to the contrary. With respect to patronage I hold the same sentiments as ever. I will go further than my colleague; I believe that at all times the executive department of the government has too much power.

The question now is what are we to do under the present state of things? In voting for this bill, I vote as I always have acted and will continue to act, upon my responsibility; and I am ready to meet that account which my constituents have a right to expect from me. I will state the reason why I now vote for two brigadier-generals, having formerly opposed them. It is this: every one knows in what situation the present commander in chief stands; and on this account would I vote for two brigadier generals—one for the Mississippi and one for the Atlantic. This is the answer I give my colleague.

I have done. Nothing is more painful to me than to be obliged to talk of myself; but there are times when not to reply would be to submit to imputations which cannot apply to me. I repeat that I never did nor ever shall hunt up the journals against any one; nor do I hold myself accountable to any one but my constituents for my conduct.

Mr. Blount said, he had so little confidence in his powers to convince gentlemen of this House who should not be convinced by the arguments of others, and so much confidence in his ability to convince his constituents, and besides having no desire to see his name in the papers as a speaker, that he never was in the habit of speaking in the House; nor should he now have risen, had not his colleague (Mr. Stanford) pursued such a course as gave evidence to him of a desire to charge with an improper motive those who should vote for the bill. It is known, said Mr. B. to as many members of the House as have long known me, that I am as little friendly to standing armies as any member who ever had a seat in it. Upon that subject, and I might say upon others, I can prove as much consistency as the gentleman who seemed to make a charge against the advocates of the bill. The gentleman himself at last allowed a fact which it was my intention to bring to his view, as I understood him when he rose to charge all with inconsistency, and to say that it had been his uniform course to vote against a regular force. In casting my eye over the journals, I found the particular circumstance to which the gentleman afterwards alluded. [Mr. B. then read an extract from the journal, stating that on the passage of the bill for encreasing the military force in '98, there were yeas 60, nays 11. Among the yeas, said he, was my colleague; and among the latter, was myself. [Mr. Blount then read the names of the minority, among which were the names of Mesrs. Blount and Sumter.]

This Thomas Sumpter is the general Sumpter, who was mentioned by my colleague as so worthy a citizen, so able a general, and so well qualified to form a correct vote. The vote which he gave at that time proved that he did entertain a proper confidence in the militia, and considered them as competent to defence. The circumstances are now different from what they then were, and therefore I have concurred with that worthy citizen and consummate general. I shall vote differently from what I then did, and that gentleman, if I may judge from his conversation, will vote the same. I shall not assign my reasons for my vote; they have been already assigned by others, and are so obvious as not to require repetition. I merely rose to justify myself from a charge of inconsistency. The gentleman apologises for his vote in '98 by saying that he yielded his opinion to a caucus. There might have been such a thing; but the journal bears testimony that if there was a caucus, I did not yield my opinion to it. I did then and always will do what appears to me to be right; and more especially standing as the Representative of others, I will do what their good appears to require.

Mr. Burwell said he would state to the House his reasons for supporting the bill on the table; like the gentleman who preceded him, he would do justice to the motives, and treat respectfully the arguments of those in opposition to it. It has been admitted by all who have spoken, after the example of the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rowan), who commenced the discussion, that some additional troops were necessary in existing circumstances; but that the proposed number was too large for a peace, and too small for a war establishment. This is an admission which leaves every person to judge of the number requisite from the view he takes of the danger to which the country is exposed. Mr. B. thought a just description had been given of our situation, enjoying neither the security of peace, or apprehending with certainty the danger of actual war; but in a state which will most probably terminate in the latter. He said, the manner in which Mr. Rose's mission had terminated, and the grounds assumed by that minister, created strong presumption of an attack from Great Britain, against which he was anxious to guard. In his answer to the Secretary of State, he says "whether any denial or such protraction of redress have occurred on her part—(G. Britain) as to render necessary or justifiable the perseverance in an edict, which when not necessary or justifiable assumes a character of aggression, and whether on the result of those considerations the negociation *can be resumed* with a due regard to his honor," &c. When we couple with this declaration the language of crimination and complaint against the proclamation; the assertion of its hostile nature and injurious effect on the naval service of his government, and the disposition known to exist towards us, it will not be unreasonable to anticipate danger. That minister tells us the proclamation has driven from this station the English ships of war, and affords protection to the vessels of their enemies; under this aspect of affairs it appeared indispensible to strengthen the accessible, and vulnerable points of the union; to reinforce the troops stationed in our distant territories, and frontier posts. But it is said, by a gentleman from N. Carolina, it will be a dereliction of principle to raise troops; because it was condemned in 1798. Mr. B. contended, that if he could shew the state of the world, and the object for raising men was dissimilar, the objection would of course fall, and he thought that could be demonstrated satisfactorily to every mind. In '98 we were engaged in a contest with France, which it was thought might be easily adjusted, and few feared an invasion which would seriously threaten our country. At that time the limits of the U. S. had not been enlarged, and the whole extent of them was peopled with numbers sufficient for their defence. France herself was then engaged in a doubtful war; pressed by a formidable combination which gave full employment to her armies and resources—she had not then extended her empire beyond Switzerland, the Netherlands and Holland, and if her armies had crossed the Rhine, they had been repelled. It was different now, she has overrun Italy, crush'd the power of Austria, conquer'd Prussia and Poland, and has settled the north of Europe to her own satisfaction—every thing is secure on that side of her—coalitions can never again divert her from favorite views. Another very important event has occurred; she has taken possession of Portugal, and will soon occupy Spain, with the last she acquires all the Spanish provinces bordering on our southern limits, the Floridas, Mexico, and Cuba; what assurance have you she will not attack your distant territories? And does any one believe, remote as they are from the populous parts of the Union, they will not fall unless you have a force to defend them? We all agree we cannot rely on the friendly disposition of that government; the documents before us, must so convince the most incredulous. Mr. B. said it was strange indeed if gentlemen could not perceive a very wide difference in the situation of France and our own at the two periods. The object for which men were raised in '98, and the one proposed now, was clearly different; and the objections equally inapplicable. It was then intended to defend the nation by regular troops, and substitute them for the militia, to supercede that species of national force intirely; a force when properly organised and well armed deemed sufficient to meet an enemy in the incipient stages of a war. The arguments in favor of the militia (the efficacy of which he fully admitted) would apply against the bill, if that was the present plan. But the troops to be raised are to be stationed where the country is sparsely settled, destitute of militia, the inhabitants of which are not sufficiently numerous to defend themselves against the incursions of a foreign enemy, or the depredations of a savage foe; they are intended to protect a part of the Union, and not the whole, and that part, which is really defenceless, because without militia. Mr. B. said if he judged of the conduct of France from what appeared to him to be her interest he should not suppose her views would be turned towards the United States; there were other objects of infinitely more importance to her in other parts of the Globe, and even on this Continent, there were acquisitions much more easy, and tempting. But, the operations of that government depended, so much upon the individual feelings and passions of the Emperor, its policy may become subservient to them; personal resentment to a man of his irritable and despotic character may mark us for his vengeance, and the weight of his power. Mr. B. said he thought it was particularly necessary to call the attention of the House to the situation of this country in relation to Great Britain, and the defenceless condition of our frontiers and territories, in case of attack; we had abundant evidences of her hostility, and knew with what facility she would make an impression upon points essential to the security of the western country, and the existence of the western people; do gentlemen recollect the extent of our limits stretching from the lakes to the Mississippi, and with that river to its mouth; that the inhabitants of this immense country are exposed to the fury of the savages in their vicinity, who are under the control of the British, and easily excited by them to hostility; he said he felt considerable apprehension from the movements of the British in Canada, and augur'd much danger from indications of the Indians; the great preparations making there; the reinforcements, which arrived last fall, those now arriving, and the expedition announced in England for North America convinced him, something was meditated against the United States. How easy was it to occupy Detroit, and ravage the adjacent country, since it was utterly destitute of a defensive force; the consequences had been sufficiently detailed by a gentleman from Kentucky who had stated the possession of that place by a foreign enemy had and would retard the population and progress of all these settlement. The western parts of Ohio, the Indiana, and Upper Louisiana territories are equally exposed; they cannot be defended against the powerful and numerous savage tribes on their borders; and if we are determined the inhabitants shall remain secure we must give them troops. The town of New-Orleans deserved particular notice, its importance to the western country, and its openness to a predatory attack from England. Mr. B. said our seaport towns generally were exposed to naval enterprises, and their wealth would invite them; it was highly important to mann the fortifications now erecting, with regulars, who would be trained to the management of cannon; the House certainly never appropriated money for this purpose without intending to use them. Nothing could be more absurd than to leave the guns & ammunition and works of the forts, without men to preserve them from destruction. It was out of the question to think of imposing garrison duty upon militia; this they would never undergo; it was irksome and disgusting in the extreme, to be confined in garrison towns, for which the militia are unfit, by their discipline, prejudices and habits. Mr. B. could not state precisely the number of troops requisite for this service, but he thought from the number of our towns, and the report of the Secretary of War, the augmentation in the bill was not too great; he declared no man felt less fear than himself of a serious invasion, or more confidence in our capacity to repel it; the scope of his reasoning was intended to shew, that this force was wanting to resist those predatory expeditions which would be directed against the weak and vulnerable parts of the Union, so thinly settled as not to afford militia for their defence, & too remote from the populated parts of the U. S. to receive timely aid.

(Mr. Burwell's speech to be continued.)

FRESH GARDEN SEEDS, &c.

The Subscriber having recently received a supply of *European Garden Seeds*, &c. which added to the various sorts saved by him the last summer, makes his assortment extensive and which are for sale at his Nursery Garden, Eastern Branch and at Dr. Ott's Medicine Store, Georg town.

THEO: HOLT

Washington city, Jan. 11—taw