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From the BOSTON GAZETTE.

MESSRS. RUSSELL & CUTLER,

In answering the letter of 19th September 1790, published in the last Boston Gazette, Mr. ADAMS's correspondent appears to have entered into some discussion of the question, whether the changes then taking place in Europe would eventually prove any thing more than *a change of impostors and impositions?*—This answer, like the first letter, and the reply, was confidential: it was a sacred trust, committed to the honor and good faith of long and intimate friendship.—The trust will not be abused—The answer has never been extracted from the receiver's files, by any hand of intrusive malevolence, to be used for malignant or insidious purposes.—There is no necessity now to publish it, as a guard against misrepresentations injurious to the writer.—There is no right to publish it without the writer's assent.—The reply therefore is published by itself—the commentators, who to adopt an observation of Montesquieu, know how to excite odium, better than how to reduce, are freely indulged with all the use they can make of it.

NEW YORK, Oct. 18, 1790.

Dear Sir,

I AM thankful to our common friend, as well as to you, for your favor of the 5th inst. which I received last night.—My fears are in unison with yours, that hay, wood and stubble will be the materials of the new political buildings in Europe, till men shall be more enlightened and friendly to each other.

You agree, that there are undoubtedly principles of political architecture, but instead of particularizing them, you seem to place all your hopes in the universal, or at least general, prevalence of knowledge and benevolence. I think with you that knowledge and benevolence ought to be promoted as much as possible, but despairing of ever seeing them sufficiently general, for the security of Society, I am for seeking institutions which may supply, in some degree, the defect. If there were no ignorance, error, or vice, there would neither be principles nor systems of civil or political government. I am not often satisfied with the opinions of Hume, but in this he seems well founded, that all projects of governments, founded in the supposition or expectation of an extraordinary degree of virtue, are evidently chimerical; nor do I believe it possible, humanly speaking, that men should ever be greatly improved in knowledge or benevolence, without assistance from the principles and system of government. I am very willing to agree with you, in fancying, that in the greatest improvements of society, government will be in the Republican form. It is a fixed principle with me, that all good government is and must be Republican. But at the same time, your candor will agree with me, that there is not in lexicography a more fraudulent word.—Whenever I use the word Republic with approbation, I mean a government, in which the people have collectively, or by representation, an essential share in the Sovereignty. The Republican forms of Poland and Venice, are much worse, and those of Holland and Bern very little better than the monarchical form in France before the late revolution. By the republican form, I know you do not mean the plan of Milton, Needham or Turgot; for after a fair trial of its miseries, the simple monarchical form will ever be, as it has ever been, preferred to it by mankind. Are we not, my friend, in danger of rendering the word republican unpopular in this country, by an indiscreet, indeterminate and equivocal use of it?—The people of England have been obliged to wean themselves from the use of it, by making it unpopular and unfashionable, because they found it was artfully used by some, and simply understood by others, to mean the government of their interregnum parliament. They found they could not wean themselves from that destructive form of government, so entirely, as that a mischievous party would not still remain in favor of it, by any other means than by making the words republic and republican unpopular. They have succeeded to such a degree, that with a great majority of that nation, a republican is as unamiable as a witch, a blasphemer, a rebel, or a tyrant. If in this country the word republic should be generally understood, as it is by some, to mean a form of government inconsistent with a mixture of three powers, forming a mutual balance, we may depend upon it, that such mischievous effects will be produced by the use of it, as will compel the people of America to renounce, detest and execrate it, as the English do. With these explanations, restrictions and limitations, I agree with you, in your love of republican government; but in no other sense.—With you I have also the honor, most perfectly, to harmonize in your sentiments of the humanity and wisdom of promoting education in knowledge, virtue and benevolence. But I think that these will confirm mankind in the opinion of the necessity of preserving and strengthening the dykes against the ocean, its tides and storms. Human appetites, passions, prejudices, and self love, will never be conquered by benevolence and knowledge alone, introduced by human means.—The Millenium itself neither supposes nor implies it. All civil government is, then to cease, and the Messiah is to reign. That happy and holy state is therefore wholly out of this question. We agree in the utility of universal education; but will nations agree in it as fully and extensively as we do? And be at the expence of it? We know, with as much certainty as attends any human knowledge, that they will not. We cannot therefore with safety advise the people to depend for *their* safety, liberty and security upon hopes and blessings which we know will not fall to their lot. If we do our duty then to the people, we shall not deceive them, to depend upon what is not in their power, and will not relieve them. Philosophers, ancient and modern, do not appear to me to have studied nature, the whole of nature, and nothing but nature. Lycurgus's principle was war and family pride—Solon's was what the people would bear, &c. The best writings of antiquity upon government, those I mean of Aristotle, Zeno and Cicero, are lost. We have human nature, society and universal history to observe and study, and from these we may draw all the real principles which ought to be regarded. Disciples will follow their masters, and interested partizans their chieftains, let us like it or not—we cannot help it. But if the true principles can be discovered, and fairly, fully and impartially laid before the people—the more light increases, the more the reason of them will be seen, and the more disciples they will have. Prejudice, passion and private interest, which will always mingle in human enquiries, one would think, might be enlisted on the side of truth, at least in the greatest number, for certainly the majority are interested in the truth, if they could see to the end of all its consequences.—"Kings have been deposed by aspiring nobles." True, and never by any other. "These" the nobles I suppose, "have waged everlasting war against the common rights of man." True, when they have been possessed of the summa imperii in one body, without a check. So have the plebeians—so have the people—so have kings—so has human nature, in every shape and combination, & so it ever will. But on the other hand, the nobles have been essential parties in the preservation of liberty, whenever and wherever it has existed. In Europe, they alone have preserved it against kings and people, wherever it has been preserved, or at least with very little assistance from the people. One hideous despotism, as horrid as that of Turkey, would have been the lot of every nation of Europe, if the nobles had not made stands. By nobles I mean not peculiarly an hereditary nobility, or any particular modification, but the natural and actual aristocracy among mankind. The existence of this you will not deny. You and I have seen four noble families rise up in Boston. These are as really a nobility in our town, as the Howards, Somersets, Burleighs, &c. in England. Blind, undistinguishing reproaches against the aristocratical part of mankind, a division which nature has made, and we cannot abolish, are neither pious nor benevolent. They are as pernicious as they are false—they serve only to foment prejudice, jealousy, animosity, envy and malevolence. They serve no ends but those of sophistry, fraud, and the spirit of party. It would not be true, but it would not be more egregiously false to say, that the *people* have waged everlasting war against the rights of men.

"The love of liberty, you say, is interwoven in the soul of man." So it is, according to La Fontaine, in that of a wolf, and I doubt whether it be much more rational, generous or social in one than in the other, until in man it is enlightened by experience, reflection, education and civil and political institutions, which are first produced and constantly supported and improved by a few, that is by the nobility. The wolf in the fable who preferred running in the forest, lean and hungry, to the sleek, plump and round sides of the dog, because he found the latter was sometimes restrained, had more love of liberty than most men. The numbers of men in all ages have preferred ease, slumber and good cheer, to liberty, when they have been in competition. We must not then depend upon the love of liberty in the soul of man alone, for its preservation. Some political institutions must be prepared, to assist this love against its enemies. Without these, the struggle will ever end only in a change of impositions and impostors. When the people, who have no property, feel the power in their own hands, to determine all questions by a majority, they ever attack those who have property, till the injured men of property lose all patience, and recur to finesse, trick and stratagem, to outwit these who have too much strength, because they have too many hands to be resisted any other way. Let us be impartial then, and speak the whole truth. Till we do, we shall never discover all the true principles that are necessary. The multitude, therefore, as well as the nobles, must have a check. This is one principle. "Were the people of England free, after they had obliged king John to concede to them their ancient rights?"—The people never did this. There was no people who pretended to any thing. It was the nobles alone. The people pretended to nothing but to be villains, vassals and retainers to the king, or the nobles. The nobles, I agree, were not free, because all was determined by a majority of their votes, or by arms, not by law. Their feuds deposed, their "Henrys, Edwards and Richards," to gratify lordly ambition—patrician rivalry and "family pride." But if they had not been deposed, those kings would have become despots, because the people would not, and could not, join the nobles in any regular and constitutional opposition to them. They would have become despots. I repeat it, and that by means of the villains, vassals and retainers aforesaid. It is not family pride, my friend, but family popularity, that does the great mischief, as well as the great good.—Pride in the heart of man, is an evil fruit, and concomitant of every advantage, of riches, of knowledge, of genius, of talents, of beauty, of strength, of virtue, and even of piety. It is sometimes as ridiculous, and often pernicious, but it is even sometimes, and in some degree, useful.—But the pride of families would be always, and only ridiculous, if it had not family popularity to work with. The attachment and devotion of the people to some families, inspires them with pride. As long as gratitude, or interest, ambition or avarice, love, hope or fear shall be human motives of action, so long will numbers attach themselves to particular families. When the people will in spite of all that can be said or done, cry a man or a family up to the skies, exaggerate all his talents and virtues, not hear a word of his weakness or faults, follow implicitly his advice, detest every man he hates; adore every man he loves, and knock down all who will not swim down the stream with him, or them, where is your remedy? When a man, or family, are thus popular, how can you prevent them from being proud? You and I know of instances in which popularity has been a wind, a tide, and a whirlwind. The history of all nations and ages is full of such examples. Popularity, that has great fortune to dazzle—splendid largesses to excite warm gratitude, sublime, beautiful and uncommon genius or talents to produce deep admiration, or any thing to support high hopes and strong fears, will be proud, and its power will be employed to mortify enemies, gratify friends—procure votes, emoluments and power. Such family popularity ever did, and will govern in every nation, in every climate, hot and cold, wet and dry—among civilized and savage people—Christians and Mahometans—Jews and Heathens.—Declamation against family pride is a pretty juvenile exercise, but unworthy of a statesman. They know the evil and danger is too serious to be sported with. The only way, God knows, is to put these families in an hole by themselves, and set two watches upon them—a superior to them all on one side, and the people on the other.

There are a few popular men in Massachusetts, my friend, who have, I fear, less honor, sincerity and virtue, than they ought to have. These, if they are not guarded against, may do another misfortune. They may create a party spirit, and a mobbish spirit, instead of a spirit of liberty, and produce another Wat Tyler's rebellion. They can do no more. But I really think their party language ought not to be countenanced, nor their Shibboleths pronounced. The miserable stuff that they utter, about the well born, is as despicable as themselves. The eugeneis of the Greeks—the bien nes of the French—the well-borners of the Germans and Dutch—the beloved families of the Greeks, are but a few samples of national expressions of the same thing, for which every nation on earth has the same expression. One would think that our scribblers were all sons of redemptioners, or transported convicts. They think with Tarquin "In novo populo ubi omnis repentina atque ex virtute nobilitas sit, futurum locum forti ac strenuo viro." Let us be impartial. There is not more of family pride on one side, than of vulgar malignity and popular envy on the other. Popularity in one family raises envy in another. But popularity of the least deserving will triumph over envy and malignity while that which is acquired by real merit will very often be overborne and oppressed by it. Let us do justice to the people, and to the nobles, for nobles there are, as I have before proved, in Boston, as well as Madrid; but to do justice to both, you must establish an arbitrator between them. This is another principle. It is time that you and I should have some sweet commune together. I do not believe that we, who have preserved for more than thirty years, an uninterrupted friendship, and have so long thought and acted harmoniously together in the worst of times, are now so far asunder in sentiment, as some people pretend. In full confidence of which, I have used this freedom.

JOHN ADAMS.

TRANSLATED

For the NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER.

A SPEECH

Of JACQUEMONT in the Tribunate, on a plan of public instruction.

We still admire those institutions of Greece, which by habits deeply impressed on infancy, by the severity of an unrelenting discipline, gave birth to useful qualities, popular virtues, and heroism the most astonishing. Such was the power of those institutions, that in the place of the natural affections which they annihilated, they substituted factitious passions, the energy of which produced effects, which resisted the destroying power of many ages. It was by these that Lycurgus rendered sacred and inviolable, regulations the most opposed to the dictates of nature; he forbade to the Spartans the purest enjoyments of moral sensibility; he imposed on them privations the most rigorous, & duties the most painful; he sought in short to make them wretched; and when after the battle of Cheronne, all the people of Greece submitted to the yoke of slavery; Sparta alone, against all the forces of Macedonia, defended with fury the most rigorous of governments.

The art of moulding (as a piece of clay) the human mind, belonged to the genius who understood perfectly its ductility. But can the use of such an art ever spring from legitimate causes? Does the social contract, necessarily require the surrender of a part of our physical existence? How comes it that education, which, among the nations of antiquity, was the most important part of their political economy, is not even alluded to in the codes of modern legislation?

The necessity of education among the Greeks, discloses the common imperfection of their political institutions.

In these memorable times when the disciples of Plato, went about disseminating among different nations, the benefits of an absolute legislation; the division and separation of the powers of sovereignty were not as yet recognised as the only foundation for liberty. The work of the legislator was not the confiding the several branches of supreme power to hands independent of each other, and under conditions the most favorable to the best employment of the whole; his wisdom rather consisted in distributing the undivided exercise, among different sections of the people, so that the operation of individual interests should not interfere with the public good. Then the government reputed the best was that in which, to make a law, an act of supreme magistracy, or to pronounce a judgment, the united suffrages of three separate bodies were necessary: namely, the multitude attached to the general interest, but who were ignorant and uninformed; the minority, who possessed knowledge, but who suborned the public, to private interests; or of one or more, who, uniting to the knowledge and interests of a small number, a different interest and equal knowledge, gained a superiority of influence over all.

Plato said to the Cretans and Lacedemonians, who enjoyed this form of government, that they alone had a true republic, and that elsewhere were to be seen only cities inhabited by masters and slaves.

In truth, when instead of this whimsical mixture of the forms of monarchies, aristocracies and democracies, the sovereignty was put into the hands of a single man, or of a few powerful ones, or of the body of the people; the general good depended on the passions of a blind multitude easily seduced, or on that of a man who, possessed of supreme power, decreed what he pleased. In a government of this kind the excesses of an unrestrained authority caused continual discords and seditions, which suddenly changed the established forms, and gave place to new ones, that were as easily destroyed. And despotism gained strength from the very exertions made to crush it.

The worst of these governments was certainly the democratic. For a people meeting on a public square, were ever led astray by their passions and their ignorance, or by the passions and ignorance of demagogues.

At Rome, where the separation of powers was little better known than in Greece, and where the exercise of a great portion of the undivided sovereignty resided in the different classes of citizens, we saw the government shaken every time the multitude usurped the authority which should have been divided between the different authorities, and thus destroyed the equilibrium of the parties who ought to separate in the application of the sovereign power.

The fall of the Athenian republic is by historians likewise equally attributed to the same usurpation of the people, favored at first by Aristides and afterwards supported and consummated by Pericles.

But whatever may have been the form of these governments, their duration depended much less on the nature of their constitutions, than on the principle which animated them. It was this principle which gave motion and existence to these ill organised bodies, which carried themselves the seed of their destruction, and the guage of national prosperity was found only in that public spirit, which held the passions and morals in subjection to the principles of each government.

This public spirit was different in different states. The dispositions, the habits, and the virtues which it required, were not the same in a democracy as in an aristocracy. They differed equally in republics differently modified; and those of Sparta could not resemble those of Athens or of Rome; every where, however, this spirit nourished an excessive love of independence, and a desire of glory, which constantly occasioned internal discords or external wars, even in the country of the arts and of philosophy.

In proportion as the principles of government were more or less favorable to the exercise of the natural faculties, the public spirit, by which it was sustained, was more or less difficult to create, and precisely in the degree of this difficulty, was the necessity of its existence, for the more feeble the political institution, the more strong should be the public spirit. Thus, it was to this point that the views and strongest efforts of the legislature was directed. It was not sufficient to have permanently fixed the organization of government, but it was likewise necessary strongly to inculcate certain ideas in infancy, and to have them fortified in every period of life, so that the habits should become indelible by constant exercise, or in other words, that a peculiar and appropriate education should be given, which might support the fragile edifices, which would crumble into dust, were the public spirit to take a foreign direction, or the public morals be corrupted. The design of this education was not to form in the people found reason, or just and enlightened ideas; but on the contrary, to obscure their understandings by national prejudices, to blind their judgment in respect to their rights and the limits of their social duties, and to inflame their imagination with the phantoms of a gigantic and supernatural virtue.

It was thus that the Greeks were formed to political morals, necessary to the maintenance of their constitutions; since these morals were to make their actions, habits and sentiments conformable to the principles of their respective governments.

Hence those precepts of the philosophers, who made moral legislation their study, respecting the influence of morals upon the liberty and preservation of the governments; hence those often repeated adages, that the laws are nothing without morals; that morals are the key to the temple of legislation, and