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For the National Intelligencer.

If duly improved, the late events in France will be replete with instruction to the United States. These events attest the vast power of the sword. It is absurd to suppose that the people of France are charmed with tyranny; or that the success of their arms has impaired their enthusiasm for liberty. No, they still sigh for freedom. But how can they acquire it? Having for defence concentered all power in the hands of a military leader, that leader has turned the energies of France on her own bosom. The *standing army has enslaved her.*

Such is the situation of Frenchmen, than whom none have exhibited greater valour and fearlessness. Her situation may not be peculiar to herself. Like causes may produce like effects. We are free, and our freemen are well acquainted with their rights. But we have ambitious men among us, who either do, or will aspire to absolute authority.—Their road to supremacy will be by war, which will require a large standing army, with which, after overcoming foreign danger, they may attempt to enslave us. They such will be the case, as all history is full of such examples. Amidst such dangers, where is liberty to look for defence?

I answer, that defence can only be found in an *energetic militia.*

Standing armies will always be the tools of their generals.—A leader of an army may sometimes be friendly to freedom. But the spectacle is a rare one, and ought not to be counted upon. On the contrary, we ought to expect that every leader of an army will exert all his power to destroy liberty; and expecting this, is it not our duty to seize the present time for the erection of a barrier, which shall either prevent altogether this evil, or successfully overcome it?

Can there on this point be a doubt? Is there a freeman who values his rights, that would refuse that small sacrifice of time which their preservation requires? If there be not one, let us awaken from our slumbers; let us act as though an enemy were at our door, and let us, by measures wise and efficient, call into existence the greatest bulwark of our happiness! Let the nation be electerised on this great concern, and let the public sentiment, by its irresistible energies, dictate to our public councils the commanding necessity of prompt and decisive measures.

An Enemy to Standing Armies.

HISTORY

OF THE

Last Session of Congress.

[Continued]

On the 17th a bill was reported, which apportioned among the several states the following members:

New-Hampshire 5; Massachusetts 17; Vermont 4; Rhode-Island 2; Connecticut 7; New-York 17; New-Jersey 6; Pennsylvania 18; Delaware 1; Maryland 3; Virginia 22; North-Carolina 12; South-Carolina 8; Georgia 4; Kentucky 6; Tennessee 3.

On the next day the house went into committee of the whole on the bill; when Mr. Macon, a representative from North Carolina, moved to strike out the ratio of "thirty three," for the purpose of inserting "thirty."

As all the subsisting diversity of opinion entertained by different members settled down into the affirmative or negative of this question, we shall condense the diffuse debate which took place on this as well as on several subsequent days, into one general point of view.

Messrs. Macon, Jones, T. Morris, Dennis, Bayard, Griswold, Giles, Smilie, and Dana, supported the striking out the ratio of "thirty-three thousand; and

Messrs. Van Ness, Bacon, Randolph, Davis, Eustis, Mitchell, S. Smith and Lowndes opposed it.

Those who supported the motion of Mr. Macon, and of course opposed the ratio of "thirty-three thousand," were divided in opinion on the grounds of support; some being in favour of the ratio of 30,000, and others in favour of a ratio still higher than 33,000.

They alleged, that no material inconvenience would arise from the increased delegations that would be created by an adoption of the ratio of 30,000, the aggregate of which would not exceed 160 members, a number much smaller than that of several state legislatures, where public business had been conducted with intelligence, with order and with promptness; that if the interests of a state required such a delegation, how much more did the interests of the United States, so vastly extended, require one equally large; that it was an object of primary magnitude to attach the confidence, and even the affections of the great mass of the people to the representative body, and that no happier mean could be devised of attaining this end, than that of an increased representation, whereby the constituent might be acquainted with his representative, and not depend, as was at present the case owing to the largeness of the district, on the opinion of others; that it was an essential principle of a republican government that the citizen voting should know whom he voted for, that the elector should be well acquainted with the elected; and though it was allowed that it was impracticable absolutely to reach this point, it was still the duty of the legislature to approach it as nearly as possible.

That it was true wisdom to increase the strength of the government of the United States; no further, it was granted, than to enable it to protect itself from subversion or depression by the unconstitutional encroachment of the states; that this strength was not to be acquired by extending the power of the executive; but by augmenting the members of the popular branch, whereby the affections of the people to the government would be invigorated; and it was added by Mr. Bayard, that more real power would be conferred by the addition of ten members, than by an army of 10,000 men.

It was contended that the House of representatives was, and necessarily would be the main pillar of the general government. While it retained the attachment and possessed the confidence of the nation, the government would endure; but if any state should succeed in weaning the affections of the people from this house and transferring their confidence exclusively to the states, the government would perish.

That it was wise to enlarge the field of action and employment under this government. So small a number occupied the ground upon the floor of that House that the talents and ambition of the mass of men aspiring to distinction were directed to state objects, and seeking the aggrandisement of the States, eventually became hostile to the general government. The representation of the country was too sparse, it was not sufficiently united and bound to the bosom of the nation. The same sympathy and confidence did not subsist between a representative and constituent when widely separated. Under the state governments, the representatives proceeded from every neighbourhood. They were well known, connected by common interests and friendship, and thence enjoyed the entire confidence of their constituents. Whereas a representative in that house was known by name only to the greater number of those who elect him.

That the representation in that house was national, and not that of states; that thence the necessity of a large representation, not merely acquainted with state interests, but also with the wants and the wishes of the whole people; and that the fear entertained that the general government might become too strong, by the means of a great representation, for the governments of the states, was altogether chimerical, inasmuch as all real alarm arose from an apprehension that the governments of the states would become too strong for this government. It was asked, by way of instance, whether it was conceivable that the confidence of the citizens of Virginia in her state representatives would be shaken, by the proposed inconsiderable addition to her federal representation?

That the suggestion that the members of that house were not the representatives of the people was founded on a dangerous principle, subversive of the government and in the face of the constitution, and which, from its being calculated to confer power on the large states, claimed a rejection by every friend to the constitution and to national harmony.

That it was necessary, considering the great powers possessed by the other branches of the government, to pursue every constitutional expedient for giving energy to that House, to enable it with effect to maintain its due weight in the government, and to resist the undue encroachment of the other branches.

It was further alleged that the ratio of 30,000 was that which left the fewest unrepresented fractions; and that considerations, no less of magnanimity than of justice, should recommend its adoption, from its effect upon the state of Delaware; which under it would be entitled to two representatives, whereas under the proposed ratio of 33,000, she would have only one representative, with an unrepresented fraction of 29,000 persons.

On the other side, those who opposed the motion to strike out "thirty-three thousand," contended that it became the legislature to ascertain and conform to the will of the people on this point; that that will had been clearly expressed in the constitution which had decided that the ratio should not be less than 30,000, and in the law passed immediately after the adoption of the constitution fixing the ratio at 33,000; that this was the ratio which had been adopted when our numbers were much less than they now are, that it appeared to have given general satisfaction, and that no other inconveniencies had accrued, than such as might be expected to follow from the adoption of any other ratio whatever.

It would seem to be rather unnatural, and the reverse of what was contemplated by those who enacted the constitution, as our numbers increased, to lessen the ratio of representation.

A divisor of 33,000, would now give a house consisting of at least 140 members, which even, on the present ratio, must soon become, not only expensive, but unwieldy.

As to what had been urged of the disadvantage to which electors were subjected in large districts, of not knowing the characters of their representatives and candidates, it was observed, that this was a disadvantage which was lessening with rapidity from year to year, and from one election to another—that to whatever inconvenience electors may heretofore have been subjected by the want of a knowledge of their candidate, from this inconvenience they are already in a great measure relieved, and it must in a short time entirely cease to exist. If any inconvenience of this kind still remains, by an election or two more it would be entirely removed.

It was contended that though the difference between the two proposed ratios was not great, yet that it was highly important that a doctrine so heretical and improper as that avowed on the opposite side should be exploded on its first annunciation; a doctrine which considered that house as the representatives not of the states, or of the people of those states in their respective sovereign capacities, but of the aggregate of the people of the United States in their national capacity; that the inevitable effect of this doctrine was a destruction of the *federal* principle on which the constitution had been founded, and a substitution of the alarming principle of consolidation; that whatever tended to produce this effect was destructive of the liberty and harmony of the people and of the stability of the government; that it was desirable that the general government should possess the entire confidence of the people so far as related to federal objects, but no further; that if the representation in that House should be increased until it should reach the numbers of a British parliament or a French convention, a proportionate diminution of confidence in the state governments would follow; until they should either be prostrated, or become feeble barriers against the ascendant powers of the general government; that under the old congress, organized on the federal principle, the smallness of the delegations had not prevented the transaction of public business with less skill or virtue than under the present government; that without enquiring whether the powers devolved on the general government exceeded the measure which true wisdom prescribed, it was certain that they did not fall short of it; and that an extension of those powers by whatever means, ought to meet with the uniform resistance of those who were friends to the federal feature of the government; that the House had been told that this accession of representatives would contribute in a higher degree to increase the power of the government than a military force; but it was to be hoped, that, after military and naval preparations, and every other expedient devised for carrying power beyond its constitutional limit had failed, the House would not be driven on the forlorn hope of the authors of those measures, who having failed in their primary means, now pursued by different means the same end, by attempting *nominally* to vest great powers in this House, which would *really* be shared by the co-ordinate branches, over which the people have little control; that the harmony of our political system depended no less upon the unimpaired sovereignties of the states, than on the exercise of the legimate powers of the general government, which were intended to be federal, leaving to the states the legislation of internal concerns. For this object, the constitution was so constructed as to compose the jarring interests of the states. Extend it further; let it embrace objects for which it was not designed; let it trench upon the powers of the states; make it a national government, in the sense contended for, and it will become a government vicious in its organization, since the reasons for that organization cease to apply, whenever it ceases to be a government of states, and becomes a government of the people in the aggregate.

With respect to the effects of the ratio of 33,000 on Delaware it was replied, that though to be regretted, that regret was lessened, when it was considered that that state more than any other participated in the powers of the government beyond the proportion of her numbers in her having, notwithstanding their inferiority, a delegation in the senate equal to that of the largest states.

Such were the *abstract* grounds on which the adoption of each ratio was urged, much of which were more ingenious than profound; and neither of which, perhaps, even allowing them to be just, conclusively established the inference deduced from them. Under the disguise of these theories lurked a more substantial source of conviction, founded on the basis of state interests, and party calculation.—Near the close of the debate, general S. Smith, with his usual openness, rent the veil, and observed, that "he had listened to the discourses of gentlemen on the abstract question introduced, and had found that every gentleman, before he sat down, proved himself to be the representative of a particular State, after all that he had said. The point was, one altogether of calculation. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Griswold) had been strong for 40,000, and now, after making his calculations, he agrees with his friend from Delaware (Mr. Bayard) in preferring 30,000, not, perhaps, because it peculiarly benefits Connecticut, but because it benefits the party with whom he acts. Let us view the gentleman from Delaware, and we see him pursuing the interests of Delaware, and caring nothing for other states, and thus he shews us that he is the representative of the State of Delaware. The gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. Macon) heretofore always economical of the public money, is for once prodigal in wishing an enlarged representation; and why? Because he thereby will promote the interest of his state. This was perfectly fair and right; and if he, Mr. Smith, were similarly situated he should act in the same way. But Maryland happened to be differently situated. The ratio of 30,000 would leave a fraction to her of 29,000. Could it therefore be expected that any member of that state would be for that ratio?"

After these discussions, which occupied the deliberation of several days, the question was taken on striking out the ratio of "thirty three thousand," and lost—Ayes 42—Noes 48. After various efforts to defeat, or postpone the bill, it was ultimately, on the 6th of January, read a third time and passed—Ayes 85—Noes 4; and after a feeble opposition confirmed in the senate.

During the progress of this discussion, the perpetual exhibition of discordant interest, more imaginary than real, and the combustible passions which a sense of it perpetually excited, demonstrated the expediency of placing the ratio of representation beyond the reach of legislative control. Whatever tends to division, without bringing with it a benefit, at least equal to the concomitant evil, ought to be avoided, so far as human wisdom can devise a remedy. In the exercise of this power, the remedy is the most easy of attainment. Instead of allowing a discretion to the legislative body to apportion its own members among the states, which in the best of times produces division and jealousy, and may, in the worst, produce injustice and corruption, the constitution should rigidly determine the number of representatives conformed to the successive gradations of population. And until this is done, a palliative should be found in the designation by law of the ratio by the congress sitting antecedently to the promulgation of the census. Thus, is the adoption of abstract principles whose local application could not be foreseen, all grounds of crimination, and all apprehension of oppression entertained by the smaller states, would be removed.

Latest Foreign Intelligence.

LEGISLATIVE BODY.

16 Floreal, 6 May.

DEFINITIVE TREATY.

The counsellors of state, Roederer, Bruix, and Berlier are introduced, to communicate to the legislative body the definitive treaty of peace between England and the French republic, and to present the plan of a law relative to the promulgation of it.

Bruix read the articles of the treaty.

Berlier then read the following message:

Citizen Legislators,

The government transmit to you the treaty which puts a period to the last dissentions of Europe, and completes the great work of peace.

The republic has fought for her independence—her independence is recognized; the acknowledgment of all powers consecrates the rights which she acquired from nature and the limits which she owes to her victories.

Another republic has been formed in the midst of her, imbibed with her principles, and seeking, at her source, the ancient spirit of the Gauls. Attached to France by the remembrance of a common origin, by common institutions, & above all by the tie of benefits, the Italian republic has taken her rank amidst powers as among our allies; she will maintain it by courage, and distinguish herself in it by virtue.

Batavia, restored to an unity of interests, freed from that double influence which vexed her councils, and misled her politics, has resumed her independence, and finds in the nation that conquered it the most faithful guarantee of her existence and her rights. The wisdom of her administration will preserve to her her splendor, and the active economy of her citizens will restore her all her prosperity.

The Helvetic republic, recognised without, is still agitated within by factions which are disputing the possession of power. The government, faithful to principles, have not exercised over an independent nation, any other influence than that of counsel; their counsel, hitherto, has been ineffectual; they still hope that the voice of wisdom and moderation will be heard, and that the neighbouring powers to Helvetia will not be forced to intervene for the purpose of putting an end to the troubles, whose continuance would endanger their own tranquility.

The republic owed it to her engagements, and to the fidelity of Spain, to use all her efforts to preserve the integrity of her territory. She has fulfilled this duty throughout the whole of the negociation, with all the energy that circumstances permitted. The King of Spain has acknowledged the loyalty of his allies, and his generosity has made to peace the sacrifice which they had attempted to spare him. He has thereby acquired new rights to the attachment of France, and a sacred claim to the gratitude of Europe. Already does the return of commerce console his states for the calamities of war, and soon will a vivifying spirit introduce into his vast possessions new activity and industry. Rome, Naples and Etruria, are reported to repose and to the arts of peace.

Lucca, under a constitution which has united all hearts, and put an end to hatred and dissention, has found again calmness and independence.

Liguria has laid down, in the silence of parties, the principal of her organization, and Genoa sees commerce and wealth return to her doors.

The republic of the Seven Isles is still, as well as Helvetia, a prey to anarchy! but in concert with France, the Emperor of Russia is sending thither the troops he had at Naples, to bring back the sole benefits which are wanting to those happy parts; tranquility, the reign of laws, and oblivion to hatred and faction.

Thus, from one end to the other, Europe sees repose again bless the continent and the sea, and her happiness founded upon the union of great powers, and the faith of treaties.

In America, the known principles of the government have restored [illegible] to Martinique, Tobago and St. Lucie. We fear no more the sway of those imprudent laws, which would have introduced into the colonies devastation and death. They aspire now only to be united to the mother country, and they bring her, with their confidence and attachment, a prosperity at least equal to that which she had left in them.

At St. Domingo great evils have been done, and great evils are to be repaired; but rebellion and revolt are daily more and more repressed. Toussaint, without stations, without treasure, without army, no more than a brigand, wandering from *morne* to *morne*, with some brigands like himself, whom our intrepid warriors are pursuing, and whom they will soon have caught and destroyed.

Peace is known at the Mauritius and in India. The first cares of government have already restored love to the republic, confidence in its laws, and every hope of prosperity.